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"Economic Issues in Crime Policy"

Anne Morrison Piehl
From 1980 to 1993, the number of inmates in state and
federal prisons tripled. Throughout this expansion, the poorlyeducated continued to be overrepresented among the nation's
prisoners. While there is renewed interest in training programs
for displaced workers, welfare recipients, and school dropouts,
the criminal justice community still reverberates the "nothing
works" judgment about rehabilitation from the 1970's.

(See

Martinson (1974).) While rapidly expanding prison populations
have led to the development of "alternative sanctions" to divert
inmates to less expensive modes of supervision, basic education
is being overlooked as a promising training program to reduce
prison populations.
The economic theory of criminal behavior provides some
predictions about the relationship between education and
criminality.

Becker's (1968) model of maximizing utility by

choosing between legal and illegal activities was extended by
Ehrlich (1975) to explicitly consider education. In Ehrlich's
model, education affects the incentive to participate in illegal
activity to the extent that it affects the relative opportunities
available to potential offenders. If the returns to education are
higher in legitimate activities, an increase in education increases
the direct payoff to legal-sector activities and increases the

opportunity cost of incarceration, thereby reducing the incentive
to commit crime. However, the value of education as a crime
prevention program must ultimately be settled empirically. I
The first two chapters of this dissertation offer several
pieces of evidence on the relationship between criminal behavior
and education received both inside and outside prison. 2 The
analysis in chapter one utilizes a new data set from the Wisconsin
Department of Corrections covering all commitments to the state
prison system over the 1980's.

In that data set, higher

IRecent research on individual criminal behavior has focused on
young men, as they are responsible for the majority of criminal
acts. While no recent econometric studies of crime have
education as their primary focus, several include education as part
of the analysis. Freeman (1992) documents the involvement of
disadvantaged young men in illegal activities, which is
particularly pronounced among those with the lowest educational
attainment. Grogger (1994) includes education in his structural
model of legal and illegal labor supply, concluding that education
matters in criminality only to the extent that it affects wages.
Viscusi (1986) fmds that participation in crime is not statistically
significantly related to years of education but is strongly related
to enrollment status in a sample of young black males in three
cities. The literature on rehabilitation of convicted offenders is
mixed, often does not provide much discussion of possible
selection effects, and often considers counseling rather than
educational programs.
2Note that educational programs are common in prison systems.
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educational achievement3 is associated with lower recidivism
rates. 4 In addition, people are learning in these prison-based
programs. Men who appear in the Wisconsin data more than
once were substantially better educated when they arrived for
their second prison term than they had been the first time they
were observed. They gain 1.3 years of schooling and 0.6 grade
levels of tested achievement over an average of four years
between admissions. It is likely that these gains are the result of
the broad array of prison education offerings. Ehrlich s theory
I

Achievement is measured by an adult basic education
standardized test administered to all inmates upon entry to the
state prison system.

3

4In the analysis of future criminal activity, both the probability
of recidivism and the time to recidivism are of substantive
interest. Specifically, the expected costs of future incarceration
for a newly-released group of prisoners depends on the
probability they return to prison. A small reduction in that
likelihood could result in substantial savings, as the average term
served is about 17 months. The recidivism savings also have a
"multiplier" effect, as that individual who does not return to
prison not only does not serve a second term, but does not return
for a third term either. The differential effects of any variable on
the probability of recidivism and the length of time until return
may help in understanding the determinants of recidivism. In this
dissertation, accelerated failure-time models are used where right
censoring of the data is substantial. In other settings, the
probability of failure and the time to failure (conditional upon
failure) are estimated separately.
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would predict that those who returned gained less from the
education programs, on average, than those who did not return.
The focus of chapter one is an evaluation of the impact on
recidivism of completing an adult basic or high school education
program while in prison.

I find that education in prison is

associated with statistically significant reductions in the
probability of recidivism and significant increases in the time until
recidivism. Since only inmates in Wisconsin prisons late in the
decade have indicators of participation in prison education
programs included in the data, here I analyze a subsample of the
administrative data. In this subsample, 39 percent were returned
to prison within four years of release. However, those inmates
who completed education program were nine percentage points
less likely to be reincarcerated over that period. Thus, not only
do those who enter prison with higher educational attainment have
lower recidivism rates, but it appears possible to reduce
recidivism by providing education in prison.
One is always concerned about endogenous determination
of a variable of interest, particularly in program evaluation, and
it is these concerns that motivate much of chapter one.
Specifically, it is possible that inmates do not learn anything
useful in prison education classes and completing a program
merely indicates something about the motivation of the inmate.
In that case, it would be wrong to attribute the lower recidivism
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rates to the program, since all the program does is sort the
offenders by their level of interest in the program, which happens
to be correlated with the probability of returning to prison.
I employ two primary methods to address possible
selection bias. First, I explore the impact of adding covariates to
explain recidivism. Here, I benefit from the rich set of controls
available in the administrative data, including indicators of
offense type, prior criminality, security classification, and test
score.

These controls should be good proxies for inmate

heterogeneity, yet none of these attenuate the effect of education
programs on recidivism.
In the second approach to accounting for possible
selection bias, I develop a flexible hazard model which allows for
the possibility that the unobservables influencing recidivism are
correlated with those influencing selection into the education
programs. This estimation strategy accommodates endogenous
selection into

the

education program without

requiring

assumptions on the form of the baseline hazard (as in a parametric
tobit model).

In addition, this approach does not rely on

exclusion restrictions to identify the selection effect.
There are two equations in this maximum likelihood
model of discrete choice. The flexible hazard equation,
(1)
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specifies the conditional probability of recidivism in period K
given it hasn't occurred before K as a function of educational
program status E; a set of regressors X, including age at
admission, race, test score, prior educational attainment, whether
or not the inmate had served other terms in prison, and sentence
length; and an unobserved random variable 6H uncorrelated with
E and X. The baseline hazard parameter,

IX,

takes on a different

value in each period. The parameter of interest here is y, which
measures the impact of completing an educational program in
prison on the conditional recidivism hazard.
To account for potential endogeneity of the educational
program status dummy, a second equation is included:
peE = 1 I X)

= 1 -eXP(-eXP(I3~X) 6.) ,

(2)

where 6s is an unobserved random variable uncorrelated with X.
Correlation between 6H and 6s is allowed, however, and this
correlation is where the selection behavior is captured .
. Heterogeneity in this model can be specified as a number of
"types" of individuals, with each type described by a distinct
pairing (6H ,6s).

The estimation identifies clusterings of

unobserved components of individual behavior, interpreted as
"types" of actors.
In estimates of the selection equation, the important
determinants of whether an inmate completes an education
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program are test score (measured upon entry to prison), whether
he has already graduated from high school, whether he has served
time in prison before, the sentence length and sentence status. 5
Inmates who have served time in the past are less likely to
complete a program in the current term. This result is likely the
sum of two effects operating in the same direction. First, inmates
who have squandered an opportunity in the past are less likely to
be recommended to a program. Second, inmates who had the
opportunity for prison education in the past and who "failed" on
the outside are less likely to succeed if given access to an
education program a second time.

Note that the latter effect

serves as a control for inmate heterogeneity. Inmates with longer
sentences are more likely to complete programs, which makes
sense since programs may take several months to complete.
In the hazard equation, the coefficient on educational
program completion is negative and significant, meaning that
those who complete programs are less likely to return to prison.
The pattern of sign and significance of the coefficients is similar
to those of the earlier models. Conditional on the other included
co variates , those who have served time in the past and those

5Based on personal observation and interviews at Dodge
Correctional Institution in the spring of 1992, these are exactly
the factors that the Assessment and Evaluation committee used in
determining assignments to prison education programs.
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released from

higher-security facilities have

statistically

significantly higher hazard rates.
In sum, selection bias does not seem to be-driving the
fmding that inmates who complete education programs have lower
rates of recidivism:

the semiparametric flexible hazard

formulation to allow for heterogeneity yields estimates similar to
those from probits and tobits which do not control for endogenous
selection.

The richness of the data and the structure of

educational assignment seem to account for the usual endogeneity
concerns.
The final piece of evidence on the relationship between
criminality and education comes from the analysis of a sample of
non-incarcerated young men in chapter two. The Boston Youth
Survey (BYS) interviewed youths 17-24 years old in low income
areas of Boston in 1989 about a wide range of socioeconomic
topics. In the BYS, I find that more schooling is associated with
lower probabilities of committing illegal activities and, for those
who report involvement in criminal activity, more schooling is
associated with lower conviction rates. In this sample, 23 percent
have committed crime in the past year. An additional year of
education is associated with a 2.8 percentage point decrease in the
predicted probability of committing crime. Among those who
have committed crime, 32 percent have been convicted.

An

additional year of education is associated with a 6.2 point drop in
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that predicted probability. In contrast to the strong effect of
education, other background characteristics do not predict
conviction.
If those individuals with the greatest likelihood of

detection desist from illegal activity, the errors in the crime
equation and the conviction equation will be negatively
correlated, leading to attenuation bias in the estimated coefficients
on education. To account for this, I propose and estimate a
simultaneous model, fmding no significant correlation between the
errors in the two equations.

Education remains a strongly

significant (negative) predictor of criminality while the statistical
significance of education as a covariate of conviction drops below
conventional levels . The results in chapter two imply that while
the over-representation in prison of those with low educational
attainment may result from both a higher probability of
committing crime and a higher probability of conviction, the
former effect is more important. The conviction effect is both
smaller quantitatively and fragile to specification.
Together, the first two chapters of the dissertation
complement existing evidence that there are high social returns to
educating people with limited access to education. For young
men in the central city, more education is associated with lower
levels of criminal behavior and, for those who are not diverted,
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education in prison reduces recidivism. 6 While one should be
cautious in interpreting results from very different samples of the
population, 7 the results of chapter two suggest that the effect of
education is to reduce criminality, not to make criminals
"smarter" (e.g., better at avoiding detection).
The estimated reduction in recidivism due to prison
education programs represents substantial social savings. These
can accrue from lower corrections expenditures, fewer crimes,
lower security costs, lower levels of crime, and higher
employment of releasees. Although the results of this research
suggest that states should be expanding their education programs
in correctional facilities, Corrections Compendium reports that
many states have cut their budgets for prison education in the past
five years, even as prison populations increased rapidly (Lillis,
(1994».
While the implications of this research for criminal justice
policy are clear, that training programs in prisons should be
expanded, the implications for employment policy are less direct.

6Across

data sources and specifications, white men gain more
from education than do blacks. This is consistent with the fmding
of Viscusi (1986).
7That is, the experience of convicted offenders in Wisconsin
may be different from the population of disadvantaged youth in
Boston.
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One implication is that consideration of criminal justice outcomes
will tilt the balance in favor of general training and employment
programs. 8

The economic model motivating this research

suggests that the recidivism reductions come from employment
effects. Further research is necessary to establish evidence for
that link: and to determine the extent to which increasing earnings
inequality in the legal sector contributes to participation in illegal
activities. It is possible that other types of employment policies,
in addition to traditional training, could have large impacts on
crime rates and criminal justice expenditure.
In chapter three, the dissertation turns to another subject
relevant to current criminal justice policy debates: immigration.
This issue has figured prominently in gubernatorial races, most
notably California, and in suits by several states to recoup, from
the federal government, public expenditures on immigrants.
Though there is much hyperbole as to whether immigration
increases the crime rate, there is no credible empirical evidence.
This chapter, written jointly with Kristin Butcher, fills this gap.

8The evaluations of the Job Corps program provide an example
of the potential importance of crime reductions as a benefit of
training programs. (See Levitan and Gallo (1988), Long et al.
(1981), and MaHar et al. (1982).) Donohue and Siegelman (1995,
p. 61) report that 40 percent of the social benefits of the Job
Corps program came from reduced crime.
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Rather than joining the debate about public expenditures,
chapter three investigates two of the possible avenues through
which immigrants might affect the criminal justice system:
immigrants may be more likely to commit crimes than natives
and/or immigrants may have an adverse impact on crime by
crowding natives out of the legal sector and into the illegal sector.
These effects both imply that crime rates would be higher in areas
with heavy immigrant concentrations, ceteris paribus. We exploit
the fact that immigration is a geographically concentrated
phenomenon and use data from the Current Population Survey
(CPS) and the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) to compare the
levels of crime in immigrant intensive cities to the levels of crime
in other cities over the period 1980-1990. 9 We find that cities
with large numbers of immigrants tend to have high crime rates
in the cross-section, but there is no evidence that areas with high
levels of immigration have experienced disproportionate growth
in criminal activity over the last decade.

Therefore, either

immigrants are no more likely to commit crimes and do not
crowd natives into crime or these two effects are offsetting.
There are several alternative explanations for this
estimated zero effect, which we examine in turn.

The first

90ur research strategy is similar to that used by others to analyze
the effect of immigration on the employment and wages of the
native-born.
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interpretation, that demographic changes are not reflected in city
crime rates, may not be surprising given the consensus in the
crime literature that it is very difficult to explain levels of crime.
A second explanation is that immigration, other migration, legal
labor market activity, and criminal activity are simultaneously
determined.lO Following Altonji and Card (1991), we control for
potential correlations between immigrant inflows and local
economic conditions by using an instrumental variables
procedure, using the initial fraction foreign-born as a predictor of
immigrant inflows over the decade. The instrumental variables
procedure does not change our estimate that increases in
immigration have no impact on growth in crime rates. These
results suggest that simultaneity is not responsible for the zero
coefficient on immigration in the first differences.
The third explanation for our results is that our data are
simply too noisy. In particular, the fraction of the population
comprised by new immigrants may be too small in most cities to
be accurately sampled by the CPS. To investigate this hypothesis,
we analyze the fraction of the population that is Hispanic rather

IOEvidence on this issue is mixed. For example, Filer (1992)
reports that immigration into a city increases native outflows and
reduces the number of natives moving in. In contrast, Butcher
and Card (1991) report that except for the three most immigrant
intensive cities (Miami, Los Angeles, New York), immigrants and
natives appear to be moving to the same cities during the 1980's.
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than the fraction of new immigrants since the two are highly
correlated and the former should be measured with less error.
We fmd that although some cities show a dramatic increase in the
fraction of the population that is Hispanic, these cities do not
experience higher than average increases in crime over the
decade. A second potential source of measurement error comes
from changes in definitions of metropolitan areas and central
cities during the 1980's. In order to test for this problem, we reran our regressions using only data from after 1983. Changing
the sample in this way does not change the estimated zero impact
of fraction recent immigrant on changes in the crime rate.
A fmal source of misspecification may be that we do not
have the timing right; perhaps it takes a certain amount of time
for an immigrant to either assimilate into the legal labor market
or enter the criminal sector. Our measure of recent immigrant,
capturing only those who immigrated in the past year, would not
pick up these effects. We attempt to address this in several ways:
by looking at the change in crime rate over the 10 year period,
and by allowing one, two and three year lags of fraction recent
immigrant to enter regressions.

None of these specification

checks alter inference.
Since the direct and indirect effects of immigration cannot
be separately identified in the city-level analysis, we also use data
on individuals from the 1980 National Longitudinal Survey of
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Youth (NLSY) to see whether immigrants are more likely to
report having committed criminal acts than natives.

In the

individual data, immigrants are significantly less likely to commit
crime whether or not one controls for other demographic
characteristics.
The findings from the metropolitan area analysis are
consistent with the literature on immigration s effect on local
I

labor markets, which finds little or no adverse effect of
immigration on the wages of natives. They are also consistent
with the crime literature, which has been quite unsuccessful at
explaining variation in crime rates across cities.

(See Land,

McCall and Cohen (1990) for a review.) Given the absence of
any relationship between immigration rates and changes in crime
rates, we conclude that it is inappropriate, as well as pointless, to
use immigration policy to achieve criminal justice goals. We fmd
no support for the idea that cities receiving large immigrant
inflows require a different employment policy than do cities
receiving large inflows of native migrants.
The evidence reported in this dissertation provides strong
testimony about several aspects of criminal justice policy and
highly suggestive testimony about employment policy. Moving
the public debate to reflect empirical realities, however, requires
much more.
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